"Methodological Individualism" by Steven Lukes
Lukes' paper is concerned with a description
of methodological individualism, which he identifies as being divisible into
four types. The first three exclude explanations which refer to structural or
institutional forces or causes, and the fourth only seems to exclude such
explanations. The four types are as follows, ranging from particularity to
generality:
i) Explanation in terms of the direct and intimate physical nature of each individual: brain states, somatic and nervous conditions, physiological states. This type absolutely excludes mention of fellow members of society that might either help or hinder the individual serving as object of explanation (by virtue of violence, activities of restriction or mutually beneficial association).
ii) Explanation in terms of the realisation of states which derive their meaning partially from external causes: aggression, friendliness, emotional response, stimulus-response. It seems somewhat difficult, at an intimate level, to discern what an uncontentious difference might be between this type and type (i), as 20th century phenomenological research has been notably influenced by the Husserlian concept of "intentionality", which teaches that much psychical activity is essentially constituted by external elements. I don't doubt that the Marxian/Hegelian conception of the individual's relation to its society as being somewhat infused with external/historical/material elements muddies the water for such a neat division, but more research will have to be conducted before such a conclusion is likely to be satisfactorily reached.
iii) Explanation in terms of thickly social phenomena: power, success, dominance, submission. These states now occupy an essentially external ground: "power", for example, though not necessarily an institutional concept, is inexplicable or senseless if devoid of external referents with whom the object of description in terms of power is supposed to be in community. Like distance, it is a concept which must be explained by locating the relation within a group ("subject x is far away", for example, of necessity must either include at least two subjects: "x" and the object from which "x" is far away. When the second object is omitted, reference to the speaker is assumed to constitute an indexical judgement). Concepts such as these (which we may term "irreducibly-multiple") comprise the third group.
iv) explanation in terms of institutional or political facts: voting, arresting, electing, legally imprisoning. These terms not only refer to irreducibly-multiple activities on the part of individuals, but also require institutional structures that provide meaning to the terminology employed. It is not necessary to venture too deeply into the philosophical problems, especially regarding intention, that present themselves here. What is the difference between a person turning on a light, rather than just flipping a switch? We may satisfy ourselves here with some provisional explanation regarding the person's voluntary intention as informed by their knowledge. The person can intentionally flip the switch while at the same time unintentionally turning on the light (or the shredder where they have inexplicably placed the only copy of their completed novel). On this score, they can pull a lever intentionally but unintentionally vote for Gordon Brown, but it is when intentional activity regarding "voting for Gordon Brown" or "arresting somebody under a certain section of the penal code" occurs that we have a type (iv) explanation as referred to by Lukes on this model.
Lukes believes that explanations of types (i) and (ii) are insufficient as they are (assumedly) excessively reductive. He believes that explanations of type (iii) are insufficient because, interestingly, he sees them as unable to "account for the differences between institutions and societies". This is probably due to the fact that when reduced to the terms of which type (iii) explanations are composed, governments, autocracies, and autonomous collectives are indistinguishable from corporations, schools and hospitals, differing as they do only in virtue of the sorts of activities that are carried out within them. Whether or not an account of this activity would lead to the requirement for a type (iv) explanation would depend on the ability of type (iii) language to explain the meaning and purpose of the activity itself.
Explanations of type (iv) are insufficient as methodological individualist explanations because they are question-begging. Simply put, individuals cannot be explained in terms of social facts as the social facts are those that require reduction. One cannot describe an individual as a "Conservative" (note the capital "C") without there being some background explanation in terms of institutions and societies to provide a meaning for the description.
i) Explanation in terms of the direct and intimate physical nature of each individual: brain states, somatic and nervous conditions, physiological states. This type absolutely excludes mention of fellow members of society that might either help or hinder the individual serving as object of explanation (by virtue of violence, activities of restriction or mutually beneficial association).
ii) Explanation in terms of the realisation of states which derive their meaning partially from external causes: aggression, friendliness, emotional response, stimulus-response. It seems somewhat difficult, at an intimate level, to discern what an uncontentious difference might be between this type and type (i), as 20th century phenomenological research has been notably influenced by the Husserlian concept of "intentionality", which teaches that much psychical activity is essentially constituted by external elements. I don't doubt that the Marxian/Hegelian conception of the individual's relation to its society as being somewhat infused with external/historical/material elements muddies the water for such a neat division, but more research will have to be conducted before such a conclusion is likely to be satisfactorily reached.
iii) Explanation in terms of thickly social phenomena: power, success, dominance, submission. These states now occupy an essentially external ground: "power", for example, though not necessarily an institutional concept, is inexplicable or senseless if devoid of external referents with whom the object of description in terms of power is supposed to be in community. Like distance, it is a concept which must be explained by locating the relation within a group ("subject x is far away", for example, of necessity must either include at least two subjects: "x" and the object from which "x" is far away. When the second object is omitted, reference to the speaker is assumed to constitute an indexical judgement). Concepts such as these (which we may term "irreducibly-multiple") comprise the third group.
iv) explanation in terms of institutional or political facts: voting, arresting, electing, legally imprisoning. These terms not only refer to irreducibly-multiple activities on the part of individuals, but also require institutional structures that provide meaning to the terminology employed. It is not necessary to venture too deeply into the philosophical problems, especially regarding intention, that present themselves here. What is the difference between a person turning on a light, rather than just flipping a switch? We may satisfy ourselves here with some provisional explanation regarding the person's voluntary intention as informed by their knowledge. The person can intentionally flip the switch while at the same time unintentionally turning on the light (or the shredder where they have inexplicably placed the only copy of their completed novel). On this score, they can pull a lever intentionally but unintentionally vote for Gordon Brown, but it is when intentional activity regarding "voting for Gordon Brown" or "arresting somebody under a certain section of the penal code" occurs that we have a type (iv) explanation as referred to by Lukes on this model.
Lukes believes that explanations of types (i) and (ii) are insufficient as they are (assumedly) excessively reductive. He believes that explanations of type (iii) are insufficient because, interestingly, he sees them as unable to "account for the differences between institutions and societies". This is probably due to the fact that when reduced to the terms of which type (iii) explanations are composed, governments, autocracies, and autonomous collectives are indistinguishable from corporations, schools and hospitals, differing as they do only in virtue of the sorts of activities that are carried out within them. Whether or not an account of this activity would lead to the requirement for a type (iv) explanation would depend on the ability of type (iii) language to explain the meaning and purpose of the activity itself.
Explanations of type (iv) are insufficient as methodological individualist explanations because they are question-begging. Simply put, individuals cannot be explained in terms of social facts as the social facts are those that require reduction. One cannot describe an individual as a "Conservative" (note the capital "C") without there being some background explanation in terms of institutions and societies to provide a meaning for the description.
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